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This paper offers an institutional explanation for the growth, organizational transformations, 
and decline of the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative 
perspective based on Latin America.  I analyze which institutional arrangements, political 
actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success and decline of the piqueteros.  
Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success, decline, 
and transformation of the organizational structures of the piquetero movement were mainly 
produced by a political cycle of deep political division within the ruling party (the Peronist 
party). Other socio-economic explanatory factors were the over-regulated Argentine labor 
market, and the exogenous impact of the Argentine economic crisis through relatively high 
unemployment rates. 
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I.- OVERVIEW 
Among the Latin American countries, only in Argentina did a social movement of well-
organized unemployed people, called piqueteros, emerge in the middle of the 1990s.1  Piqueteros, 
organized in several autonomous associations, claim social assistance from the Argentine 
government in the form of temporary jobs, special subsidies, and food assistance.  To better achieve 
its goals, the piquetero movement established a mutually beneficial but at the same time a 
conflictive relationship with the Argentine state.  
The piquetero movement is split into several organizations, of which seven are the most 
important.2  To achieve their goals, they have organized several massive protests in the main cities 
of Argentina, which have led to the occupation of squares, avenues, public buildings, and business 
premises.  To achieve these goals, the organizations of piqueteros have been able to incorporate a 
number of members by providing them with food and subsidies thanks to the social programs 
Trabajar and Planes Jefe y Jefa de Familia (Lobato & Suriano, 2003; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006).3   
This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the success, sustainability, organizational 
transformations, and decay of the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a 
comparative perspective based on Latin America.  The selection of Latin America as a framework 
for comparison allows for achieving valuable conclusions due to the use of a relatively large range 
of countries.  At the same time, because of similarities among Latin American countries in terms of 
                                                
1 Iván Schneider and Rodrigo Conti (2003) claim that the first important piquetes (occupation of roads or avenues) 
occurred in the middle of 1995.  Maristella Svampa & Sebastián Pereyra (2003), however, claim that the piqueteros 
movement acquired a solid organization only after 1997. I also use the definition of a social movement taken from John 
McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1987) which states, a social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward redistribution, or both, of a 
society. 
2 See Table 3. 
3 The Programa Trabajar was a temporary unemployment relief program that was in place between 1996 and 2002. In 
May 2002, Trabajar replaced by a more extensive program called Planes Jefes y Jefas de Familia. Thus, the less 
than a quarter of a million beneficiaries of the program Trabajar was increased to approximately two millions the 
program Planes Jefes y Jefas de Familia was created (Galasso and Ravallion, 2003). The Planes Jefes y Jefas de 
Familia was created in the midst of the 2002 crisis. It was the first universal unemployment subsidy policy in more 
than 25 years.  
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their culture and their economic and political development, I will be able to isolate and determine 
clearly the impact of key variables on the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement. 
Within this comparative framework, the piquetero movement is part of a major trend in 
social movement activity in the region, largely focused on demands that are specific and territorially 
based; not on structural changes.  Following this tendency, the piquetero movement did not demand 
significant structural changes in the Argentine government.  Structural demands such as a 
nationalization of oil and other energy resources, a broad default on all external debts, a 
constitutional assembly, and a change towards a socialist regime have remained purely rhetorical 
and excluded from any negotiation with the Argentine executive.   
On the contrary, the piquetero movement has established both a mutually beneficial and 
conflictive relationship with political actors in the Argentine executive branch.  In this paper, I 
present and analyze the institutional dynamics of this mutually beneficial but conflictive 
relationship.  Other Latin American movements that have established either cooperative or 
conflictive relationships with the state do not present the particular institutional dynamics and 
mechanisms of the piquetero movement.  The presence of these dynamics -- characterized by the 
division of the ruling party, the federal government, and the movement into two competing factions 
-- makes the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement a fascinating case in the region. 
Because of the presence of both the supportive and conflictive relationships between the 
piquetero movement and the Argentine executive, and the way in which this relationship was 
developed and structured, the current literature on social movements does not offer an accurate and 
complete framework to fully understand the conditions and reasons behind the growth, endurance, 
and decline of the piquetero movement.  In addition, as McCarthy and Wolfson state (1992), 
cooptation for social movements tends to happen locally, at regional levels, or only for certain 
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infrastructural locations. Cooptation of national-level movements by state actors tends to be rare 
and all these types of movements tend to be short-lived.4   The piquetero movement is not only a 
national-level movement, but also one that has remained alive for a relatively long period (since 
1995).  All these features make the piquetero movement a fascinating case for analysis.  This paper 
attempts to offer an explanation in order to fill this gap in the literature and account for the success 
of the piquetero movement.   
In order to explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement, one set of possible 
explanations focuses on economic factors such as the economic crisis, the high unemployment rates, 
and the lack of flexibility of the Argentine labor market.  The other set focuses on political factors 
such as the relationship between the piquetero movement and labor unions, and the cooptation of 
the piquetero movement by the Argentine state in somewhat mutually beneficial and conflictive 
relationships.  Likewise, the decline of the movement measured by the number of protests respond 
basically to both the changing relationship between the Argentine state and the decline in the 
unemployment rates. 
After discussing the limitations of the economic explanations, I turn to evaluate the effect of 
the political factors that triggered and shaped this social phenomenon.  After a selective comparison 
of all these factors, I find that the features of the political interaction between the piquetero 
movement and the Argentine state are critical not only to understand the case at hand, but also to 
predict or anticipate the growth and success of this kind of movement elsewhere in Latin America.  
Thus, the study of this case potentially offers a new explanation to evaluate and fully understand the 
growth and endurance of social movements with mutually beneficial relationships with politicians, 
bureaucrats, or institutions of the Latin American states. 
                                                
4  These features are even valid for movements that find widespread support for their goals and little or no organized 
opposition from the population of a geographic community. These movements are much more likely to be co-opted by 
state structures. 
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II.- RISE AND ENDURANCE OF THE MOVEMENT 
Economic factors (the context) 
The Latin American debt crisis and the 1980s recession, caused by the exhaustion of the 
import substitution model of the previous decades coupled with excessive international lending, 
triggered a process of economic liberalization throughout the region that modified both the political 
strategies and industrial bargaining power of organized labor (Collier, 1979; Levitsky & Way, 
1998).  In an effort to successfully address the crisis, most Latin American countries began opening 
their economies and adjusting their states through privatization, deregulation, and decentralization 
in the 1990s (Cox Edwards, 1997).  The level of unemployment in the region that had begun to 
increase during the 1980s recession peaked due to privatizations negative effect (Birch & Haar, 
2000).  Table 1 shows the evolution of unemployment in several countries of the region since 1990. 
[ Table 1 Here ] 
Several countries reached high rates of urban unemployment such as Argentina, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, and Colombia during this period.  Although Argentina registered a high level of 
unemployment in 1995 when the piquetero movement emerged, it is also possible to find other 
Latin American countries with similarly high rates, such as Colombia in 1998 or 1999 or Nicaragua 
in 1993, 1994, and 1995 during the same decade.  However, no other country in Latin America has 
experienced the growth of a well-organized social movement of unemployed people.  Thus, high 
unemployment rates cannot entirely explain the growth and endurance of the piqueteros in 
Argentina.5 
The level of social discontent in Argentina was also triggered by an economic recession in 
1995.  The Argentine GDP fell 4.2 percentage points in that year, when the social movement 
                                                
5 However, I do not deny that unemployment played an important role in strengthening the piquetero movement. In the 
literature on the piquetero movement, this role has been emphasized by Isabella Alcañiz and Melissa Scheier (2007). 
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emerged.  Nevertheless, during the recovery, with growth rates of 4.8 and 8.6 respectively in 1996 
and 1997 (Parodi, 2003), the piquetero movement continued to grow (Lobato & Suriano, 2003).  
The kind of short economic recession that occurred in Argentina in 1995 is common in any 
economy, but in no other short economic recession has a social movement of unemployed people 
emerged.  Therefore, the general economic framework produced by the 1995 short recession cannot 
entirely explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement. In addition, the lack of 
flexibility and the high regulation of the Argentine labor market, also present in other Latin 
American countries, cannot contribute to a convincing explanation on the growth and endurance of 
the movement.6  
                                                
6  Regulation has tended to raise labor costs, create barriers to entry, and introduce rigidities in the employment structure 
in Latin America. According to Alejandra Cox Edwards (1997), there are four areas of direct intervention by 
government in the labor market.  These areas consist of wage determination, including collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution; job security legislation; mandatory contributions to social security; and subsidies for workers training.  Such 
labor market regulations make formal employment more expensive and thus, these state interventions contribute to an 
over-expansion of precarious forms of temporary employment or informal employment, a feature of the piquetero 
movement.  Finally, these regulations hinder countries from responding rapidly to new challenges from increased 
foreign competition.   
In the Argentine case, some scholars such as Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya (2000) have blamed 
Argentinas persistent high rate of formal unemployment on an increasingly binding lack of market flexibility in the 
area of labor regulations.  In particular, severance payment regulations hurt employment decisions.  Thus, firms 
substitute workers for a more intensive use of hours.  In addition to these regulations, Carola Pessino (1997) argues that 
both the high fixed costs of hiring and the restrictive collective bargaining agreements in Argentina have reduced labor 
demand, and consequently, have increased the rate of formal unemployment.  Indeed, the constraints of labor 
regulations may have provided additional incentives for the consolidation of the informal nature of the piquetero 
movement.  
However, Sebastian Edwards and Nora Lustig (1997) argue that this lack of flexibility and the high regulation 
of the Argentine labor market were also present in most other Latin American countries.  Thus, Edwards and Lustig 
state:  
Although reform programs have affected almost every sector, labor markets remain highly 
regulated in most countries.  In the mid-1990s the vast majority of Latin American nations 
continued to rely on labor legislation enacted in the 1950s and 1960s or even earlier, favoring 
employment protection, with lifelong job security in the public sector, and taxing labor heavily.  As 
of 1997, only a handful of countries had reformed their labor markets in a significant way. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the labor market has been forgotten in Latin Americas economic reform 
(1).   
 
For Edwards and Lustig, labor market regulations and institutions in most Latin American countries remained 
restrictive in the mid-1990s.  The excessive regulations favoring job security, high payroll taxes, and restrictive policies 
on minimum wages have all had a negative effect on market flexibility and employment generation in the formal sector 
in most of the Latin American countries.  Alejandra Cox Edwards (1997) also highlights the excess of labor market 
regulation in most countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region.  These regulations have included detailed 
conditions for labor contracts for all workers in the formal sector: limits to temporary contracts, legal barriers to 
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Hence, when applied in isolation as well as from a comparative perspective, none of these 
economic explanations (such as unemployment rates, market regulations, and the temporary crisis 
of 1995) can fully explain the growth and success of the piquetero movement in Argentina.  What 
other factors, then, could explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement in 
Argentina? This question poses a challenging puzzle for scholars from other disciplines within the 
social sciences besides economics.  In order to explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero 
movement, we should take into consideration the extensive literature that scholars from other social 
sciences have developed on the growth of social movements.  However, as noted earlier, the 
institutional dynamics and mechanisms of the mutually beneficial relationship of the piquetero 
movement with the Argentine state makes the existing literature unable of fully explaining the 
growth and endurance of this social movement.  
Therefore, considering this gap in the current literature, how should we explain the success 
of the piquetero movement from a comparative framework based on Latin America? This is the 
puzzle that this paper attempts to solve.  In spite of this limitation, the current literature on social 
movements represents an ideal starting point to analyze the rise of this social phenomenon. 
 This literature developed from other social sciences to explain social movements behavior 
can be divided along two main lines: those concerned with the notion of identity and those 
concerned with strategy and material needs (Cohen, 1985).  In this paper, I employ the 
methodological tools developed by the school focused on strategies and material needs in order to 
explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero social movement. 
                                                                                                                                                            
employer-initiated dismissal, employer liability in the case of dismissal, vacation days, extensive maternity leave, and 
employer obligation to provide meals, transportation, and accommodation. Cox Edwards points out that only Chile, 
Perú and Colombia have introduced broad changes to deregulate their labor markets.  
Yet a comparison between the Argentine labor market and other Latin American countries reveals that lack of labor 
flexibility and the rigid design of formal unemployment insurance were characteristic not only of Argentina, but of the 
region as a whole. Therefore, the excessive regulation in the Argentine labor market cannot by itself entirely explain the 
growth and endurance of the piquetero movement. 
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Strategic factors 
Since the early 1980s, many collective forms of protest in Latin America, especially in 
urban areas, have emerged.  New interests and new ways of doing politics are central to these 
protests. This new wave includes the emergence of peasant movements, agrarian reform 
movements, and student revolutionary movements among others (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). Some 
of these new Latin American social movements have shared two basic characteristics.  First, these 
social movements have emerged primarily in response to material demands (Arato, 1992; Baker, 
2002; Escobar, 1992; Hellman, 1992).  Related to this feature, Judith Hellman (53) argues, Their 
struggles are principally organized around the satisfaction of basic needs.7  Second, the 
relationships of these movements with political parties or with the state have been tense and 
characterized by conflict (Calderón, Piscitelli & Reyna, 1992; Hellman 1992).  
The piquetero social movement clearly shares the features of basic needs and conflictive 
relationship.  Thus, the typical member of the movement is an unemployed Argentine citizen 
interested in getting subsidies to improve his or her conditions of life.  Nevertheless, as we will see, 
the relationship between the piquetero movement and the Argentine executive has also been 
mutually beneficial to some extent, and not strictly one of confrontation.   
Likewise, the basic assumption of power of the political process model based on institutions 
and configurations of power will be useful in order to identify the political causes that contributed 
to the growth of the piquetero movement.8  Thus, my goal is to identify which institutional 
                                                
7 Other types of new social movements in Latin America do not share this need-based characteristic. A significant 
portion of contemporary social movement literature is concerned with the emergence of identity-based movements 
during the same period, such as womens rights, indigenous rights, and gay rights movements. 
8 For example, under this assumption, another group of scholars has been able to identify other causes for the emergence 
of social movements based on institutions and configurations of power. For example, Scott Mainwaring (1986), Cathy 
Schneider (1995), and Miguel Carter (2003) found that the Roman Catholic Church has encouraged movement 
development in several Latin American countries.  For the development of some other social movements in Latin 
America, the Roman Catholic Church played a central role as an irreplaceable ally. 
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arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the growth and endurance 
of the piquetero movement. 
Therefore, I will focus on these two premises provided by the previous literature on Latin 
American social movements: satisfaction of basic needs and the nature of institutional arrangements 
that contributed to the movements growth. Because institutions significantly influence individual 
behavior and help determine the parameters within which choices are made and through which 
preferences are derived, they will provide us with valuable information in order to identify the 
relevant causal relationships in my analysis (March and Olsen, 1984; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987).9   
With respect to the external institutional incentives for the piquetero movement, I find that 
the two relevant key political factors that encouraged the piquetero movement are: 1. - the particular 
structure of the current ruling party (the Peronist party) and its effects on the internal disputes 
within the executive branch for getting relatively more political rank; and 2. - the relationship 
between the piquetero associations and Argentine labor unions. Although political parties and labor 
unions have influenced the growth of other Latin American social movements, I argue that these 
institutions have played a central role in the sustainability, endurance, and decline of the piqueteros.  
I explore the rationality underlying institutional incentives in the following parts of this paper.   
The institutional explanation: Piqueteros and the Argentine state 
1.- The clientelist demand 
The first interaction that is worthy of more extensive evaluation is that between the Peronist 
party and the piquetero movement.  The piquetero movement emerged when a conflict divided the 
Peronist party. The party was divided between its two visible caudillos, or leaders: Carlos 
                                                
9 Institutions in this paper are defined as the formal rules that constrain and shape the behavior of individuals and 
political actors, who attempt to maximize their utility as rational actors (North, 1990). 
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Menem, who wanted to be reelected in 1999, and Eduardo Duhalde, who retained considerable 
power in the province of Buenos Aires and in the Peronist party (Almeyra, 2004; Levitsky 2003.)   
This division and decentralization within the Peronist party has been explained by several 
scholars. Thus, for example, Kurt Weyland (1999) concludes that the Peronist partys 
organizational structure is inoperative, and that its leaders hold adversarial relationships among 
themselves and personalistic relationships with the Peronist rank.  With a slightly different 
interpretation, Steven Levitsky (2003) points out that the Peronist party is an informal mass party 
with deep roots in working and lower class society.  However, because the party is informally 
organized and weakly institutionalized, the formal leadership bodies lack independent authority and 
autonomy from the main political leaders.  Thus, with this weak and ineffective central bureaucracy, 
the party fails to integrate all the subunits (the mass) or to link them together horizontally.  
Finally, in order to measure the levels of party centralization across the polities of the Latin 
American region, Mark Jones (2005) offers a party centralization index, in which Argentina remains 
as having the most decentralized parties in the region. This index centers the analysis on the sources 
of leverage that party leaders have according to the electoral system.10  
[ Table 2 Here ] 
Thus, negotiations between the Peronist partys main leaders and the local leaders lies on 
the latters control of the construction of the local party lists, through closed lists.  Due to this 
institutional rule, Argentine legislators have a strong incentive to keep a good relationship with their 
local party leaders.  Therefore, a main leaders ability to influence legislators of his own party also 
depends on whether the provincial party leaders support the administration (Jones, 2005).  All these 
institutional rules of Argentine federalism have made local party leaders, especially governors, 
                                                
10 For more details on how this index was constructed, see Table 2 in the Appendix. 
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crucial players both in provincial politics and in the formation of national political coalitions 
(Monaldi, 2005). 
In addition, although the 1985 Political Parties Law requires that Argentine political parties 
have democratic elections for intra-party leadership positions, this law does not force political 
parties to choose candidates for public office.  In the election of these leaders, three methods of 
candidate selection were employed by the political parties between 1983 and 2001: 1) elite 
arrangement (imposition of a list by a caudillo); 2) assembly election; and 3) and direct primary 
election.  
The overwhelming majority of candidates in Latin America are usually chosen by elite 
arrangement, with a few exceptions (De Luca, Jones, and Tula, 2002). These rare primary elections 
took place in Mexico (Partido Revolucionario Institucional in 1999), Honduras (Partido Nacional 
in 1996), and Costa Rica (Partido de Liberacion Nacional in 1997).  Therefore, from a comparative 
perspective, the two types of intra-party elections  assembly election and direct primary election - 
have been only present in Argentina among the countries with relatively high rates of 
unemployment such as Colombia, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
According to Miguel De Luca, Mark Jones, and Maria Ines Tula (2002), when elections take 
place, every list tries to obtain the strong support of its own machinery composed of regional or 
neighborhood leaders.  In addition, every list needs other organized groups with strong ability to 
mobilize large numbers of people.  To maximize the likelihood of being elected in these intra-party 
elections, the potential cooptation of the piqueteros was a price that Peronist politicians could not 
afford to evade. Therefore, the design of the electoral system in Argentina can also help to 
understand why the Peronist leaders decided to deliver subsidies through working with the 
piqueteros, and not only with citizens at large.  Thus, it was rational and politically profitable for 
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Peronist leaders to distribute part of their available public subsidies through the piquetero 
movement instead of distributing the totality of their resources to buy votes at the national level.  
In addition to the Argentine electoral rules and its effects on the Argentine ruling party, the 
other institutional set of rules that defines the relationship between the national leaders and the 
regional political bosses is determined by the Argentine federalism.  In the Argentine federal 
system, a certain portion of fiscal resources is distributed among the provinces and local 
governments (through the law of Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos.)11  Through these fiscal 
laws and financial transfers, local leaders can achieve some political autonomy from the Argentine 
executive.  Because of the existence of these rules, Lucinda Benton (2002) argues that national 
leaders must grant political and fiscal benefits to the local leaders of the political parties to succeed 
in their political careers.  
Thus, these benefits and financial resources are constantly negotiated between the national 
leaders and their political bosses.  For example, because of the mechanisms of fiscal distribution of 
resources established by the law of Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos, each main leader and his 
political Peronist allies in the Congress (Senate) can negotiate with the local leaders fiscal transfers 
of financial resources to the provinces. In exchange for these fiscal resources, these national 
political leaders ask the local leaders for support of their personal agendas and those of their nearest 
political allies in the party (Benton, 2002).  
These constant negotiations and compromises have helped reinforce the relationships 
between the main leaders and the local-level political bosses across the Argentine government.  On 
the one hand, the main leaders, Duhalde and Menem, competed with each other to achieve support 
                                                
11 The Coparticipación Federal is the process by which part of the taxes collected by the central government are 
reallocated to the provinces.  Under this institutional mechanism, the distribution of fiscal resources among the 
provinces is not uniform (Tomassi,  2002).  
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from the regional leaders, and on the other hand, the local leaders fought among them for Duhalde 
or Menems support for their agendas in their jurisdictions. 
During the first years of the piquetero movement, this decentralized and informal structure 
of the ruling party allowed the main political leaders, Menem and Duhalde, to accumulate relatively 
more political power than their competitors, and enabled them to execute this power over other 
agencies, local politicians, and regional governments across the Argentine polity (Jones, 1997, 
2002).  It seems logical to conclude that the particular decentralized structure of the ruling party 
(Peronist), clearly influenced by the electoral and federal systems in Argentina, contributed to the 
growth and consolidation of two main leaders as equilibrium: Duhalde-Menem first, and Duhalde-
Kirchner afterwards.  
It was precisely the division of the ruling party and the federal government into two main 
factions - coupled with its interaction with the piquetero movement and the division of the 
movement into two factions - that made the growth and endurance of this type of movement 
possible in Latin America.  Thus, from a comparative perspective, there have not been ruling parties 
or Latin American executive branches so clearly divided into two factions in the region.   
This division of the ruling party and the federal government is not only important to explain 
the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement, but also relevant to understand the intra-
movement dynamics.  Moreover, as I also note below, this decentralized institutional dynamics also 
divided the organizations of the piquetero movement into several organizational groups that were 
aligned with one of the two factions of the federal government.12   
As mentioned above, the (partially) mutually beneficial relationship and (partially) 
conflictive relationship along with the particular institutional dynamics between the Argentine 
state and the piquetero movement cannot be found as a feature in other Latin American movements.  
                                                
12 See Table 3. 
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What can be found is literature on social movements that hold either cooperative or conflictive ties 
with states (Passy and Giugni, 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Koopmans 
and Statham, 1999).  Nevertheless, there is not a specific model or theoretical framework in the 
previous literature that can explain the particular institutional dynamics and mechanisms with two 
competing factions within the ruling party, the executive branch, and the social movement.   
Hence, under this decentralized and divided structure of the ruling party and the rules of the 
federal government, Duhaldes main challenge was to avoid Menems reelection and to consolidate 
his power within the Peronist party and the Argentine state.13  Thus, the lack of cohesion within the 
Peronist party, the adversarial relationships among leaders, the strength of the national leaders, and 
the informal organization of the ruling party allowed Duhalde to pursue these goals.  As Levitsky 
points out:  
Duhalde began to build a provincial base in 1990, when he created the Federal 
League, which was based on a network of local party and union leaders who opposed 
then Governor CafieroAfter winning the governorship, Duhalde based on an 
alliance between the League and the ex-Cafieristas, who had organized the Buenos 
Aires Peronist League (LIBEPO). 
 
By 1995, not only had the Duhaldista Machine consolidated its influence in the Province of 
Buenos Aires, but also in many bureaucratic dependencies of the Argentine state across the 
provinces.  By obtaining support from a portion of the Peronist partys elite, Duhalde could build 
up his own clientelist network (Oviedo, 2001).  Thus, Duhaldes achievement can be explained by 
the combination of the characteristics of the Peronist party and the federal government.  In 
particular, the division within the ruling party and the fragmentation within the federal government 
                                                
13 Barbara Geddes (1994) introduces the assumption in the rational choice literature that conceives of the state as a 
collection of self-interested political leaders. Geddes model considers politicians and bureaucrats to be rational 
individuals who attempt to maximize career success, based on certain preferences.  Thus, for example, for party leaders, 
Geddes (1993, 169) states, Party leaders further their careers by increasing the electoral success of their parties and by 
achieving greater influence within their parties. Many of their goals will thus coincide with those of politicians in their 
parties, since both politicians and party leaders benefit from policies that give their party electoral advantages. 
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influenced the direction of the alliances that the regional leaders forged with the two main political 
leaders.  Mariano Tomassi (2002) makes explicit this last mechanism when he describes Duhaldes 
strategies: 
First in fighting Menem's reelection bid, and then in fighting the interparty 
presidential competition as the Peronist candidate, Duhalde made generous use of 
the largest budget in the country, that of the province of Buenos Aires.  Given the 
importance of the province, and the federal fiscal linkages emphasized in this 
paper, those actions had dire consequences for Argentina. 
 
 Thus, in order to avoid Menems reelection and to strengthen his political base, Duhalde 
viewed the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement as presenting a vehicle for achieving 
these goals through patronage and strategic alliance-building.  Through these alliances and 
patronage, Duhaldes ultimate goal was to mobilize protests to discredit Menems government, to 
buy votes14, and to ensure favorable results in future elections.       
Therefore, by competing, Menem and Duhalde strengthened political clientelism by 
providing food and subsidies to as many different sectors as they could.15  Moreover, because there 
were no substantial claims for substantial structural changes in the Argentine state from the 
piquetero associations, Menem and Duhalde felt comfortable in continuing their clientelist 
strategies to gain more political support from this new and potential political market.  This 
competition reshaped the nature of alliances between several political bosses at various levels of the 
Argentine government and the leaders of key groups in civil society. New emerging leaders, 
                                                
14 The effectiveness of this strategy has been carefully analyzed by Susan Stokes, Valeria Brusco, and Marcelo 
Nazareno (2004). In survey research conducted in Argentina, Stokes, Brusco, and Nazareno found a significant 
correlation between clientelistic policies and voting behavior.  To explain this outcome, these scholars point out that 
people receiving gifts and subsidies are focused on parties programmatic appeals rather than on past performance in 
deciding how to vote.  This machines ability to hold voters accountable for their votes was called preserve 
accountability by Susan Stokes (2005). 
15 Gay (1990) defines political clietelism as the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office holders or 
political candidates in exchange for political support, primarilyalthough not exclusivelyin the form of the vote.  
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organizing masses of unemployed people, found this political competition particularly attractive.16 
Therefore, the emergence of the piqueteros in 1995 coincided with the division and conflict within 
the Peronist party, but not with a radical change in the social programs previously implemented by 
the former President Raúl Alfonsín. 
It is also important to point out that the co-optation of the piqueteros was also facilitated by 
social linkages that bind unionists and Peronism.  These social linkages were mainly forged during 
periods of shared adversity and struggle against military rule (Levitzky & Way, 1998).  Steven 
Levitzky and Lucan Way add,  
a clear example is the relationship between Carlos Menem and CGT leaders Diego 
Ibanez and Lorenzo Miguel, with whom Menem was detained after the 1976 military 
coup. Menem and Ibanez shared a cell during the three years they spent in prison 
together.  
 
 Because the piquetero leaders have previously been leaders or key members of labor unions, 
several of these leaders could also maintain personal relationships with influential members of the 
Peronist party (Almeyra, 2004).17  This fact also could have contributed to a more efficient process 
                                                
16 Felipe Auyero (2000) argues that the experience of clientelism in Argentina proved to be a decisive factor in the 
workings of hierarchical social arrangements between contemporary Peronism and its clients. Thus, Auyero states, The 
structure of relations among brokers, clients, inner circles, and state officials as well as the location of individual actors 
in the network are the bases for exploring their behavior, perceptions, and attitudes. 
17The interaction between the Argentine labor unions and the piquetero movement is characterized by a supportive 
relationship between the Argentine labor unions and the piquetero movement.  The current support of the former for the 
latter can also be explained using the basic assumption of rationality.  Because labor unions intend to provide their 
associate members with high salaries and wages, these organizations always attempt to keep the labor supply at low 
levels.  Basic economic theory predicts that a contraction in the labor supply would increase wages in a labor market.  
Therefore, the permanence and consolidation of the piquetero members as an unemployed mass of people would favor 
the unions long-term goal of high salaries or wages in the formalized labor sector. 
In exchange for remaining unemployed, the piquetero movement gains the political support of labor unions. For 
example, Luis DElia, leader of the piquetero association Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), said in an interview 
that the association of his organization with the labor union Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) was 
convenient. The piquetero association FTV is now part of the labor union Central de Trabajadores Argentinos. Ana 
Dinerstein (2003) describes accurately this relationship, The FTV leaders became members of the executive committee 
of the union and both manage the unemployment programmes for the region.   In addition, the labor union Central de 
Trabajadores Argentinos has close relations with the Corriente Combativa Clasista. (Rauber, 2002; Dinerstein, 
2003). According to table 3, the piquetero associations Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) and the Corriente 
Combativa Clasista are the most important piquetero associations in terms of the number of social plans that they 
manage. For DElía, the piquetero movement achieved both unemployment insurance and its institutionalization with 
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of co-optation by reducing the transactional costs of the process. Finally, according to Levitzky and 
Way, union dependence on the Peronist party (and on the State) is quite pronounced in Argentina.  
To support this argument, Levitzky and Way argue, Financially, only a small fraction of union 
income is derived from membership dues, and therefore, most unions rely heavily on resources over 
which the government exercises at least some discretion. By providing more information and, 
consequently more predictability, these financial procedures -- already common and recurrent -- 
could also reduce the transactional costs in the bargaining process between the piquetero leaders 
and the Peronist leaders. 
The same scheme previously framed for Menem and Duhalde could also be applied to 
analyze the interaction between President Néstor Kirchner and Eduardo Duhalde.  When Néstor 
Kirchner assumed the presidency in 2003, he lacked significant political support from his own 
political party (Partido Peronista or Justicialista). Most of the Peronist political bosses were aligned 
with the other strong leader of the Peronist party---the former President Eduardo Duhalde.  
However, in the years since taking office, Kirchner has attempted to forge solid political support in 
order to consolidate a greater margin of political autonomy within the Argentine government.  The 
                                                                                                                                                            
the political support of the unions.  Moreover, DElia added that because of the implementation of this unemployment 
insurance, the labor unions achieved higher wages for their members (Almeyra, 148).  
The economic explanation for this relationship is simple.  In the context of an economic crisis, wages tend to experience 
a reduction because of a contraction in the demand of labor, and at the same time, a very likely expansion in the supply 
of labor.  The expansion in the supply of labor can occur due to a reduction in the reservation wage, a product of the 
economic crisis through fewer available jobs and increased needs for cash.  The strategy employed by labor unions with 
its support was to increase the reservation wages of the piqueteros through more organizational support and political 
pressure.  Thus, the final goal of the unions with these actions was to secure and potentially increase the transfer of 
subsidies from the executive to the movement.  
Like the FTV, and as noted earlier, the other piquetero associations also have strong linkages with leaders of several 
Argentine labor unions (Dinerstein, 2001; Patroni, 2002; Rauber, 2002; Almeyra, 2004).  These linkages have allowed 
piquetero leaders and unionists to build cooperative relations.  Considering the high rates of Argentine unemployment, 
and the dimensions of the formal and informal sector in the Argentine economy, this group of leaders (associated, in 
general, with labor unions) has been able to segment the market between unions of workers and unemployed people and 
thus, to maximize political rank.  This segmentation has also helped this elite among unionists compensate, to some 
extent, for the loss of influence and organizational power it experienced during Menems government (Levitzky & Way, 
1998).  Thus, this strategic association between labor unions and piqueteros could be considered a positive-sum 
equilibrium for both social networks. 
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piquetero movement has clearly represented a tool to achieve this goal.  Moreover, due to the 
suddenly high (and increasing) rates of unemployment and social decomposition of Argentine 
society produced by the deep economic crisis of 2002,18 Kirchner saw the co-optation of the 
increasing mass of the unemployed as an opportunity to avoid or minimize any generalized 
dissatisfaction with his government. 
Nevertheless, Kirchners efforts to achieve more political power have created a permanent 
conflict of interest with Duhaldes supporters within the Argentine government and the Peronist 
party.  Furthermore, although the origin of the piquetero movement was strongly influenced by the 
Menem-Duhalde rivalry, its expansion and consolidation were in part intensified by the Duhalde-
Kirchner rivalry. 
The division of the piquetero movement into two political branches and several associations 
demonstrates the considerable level of influence of the Peronist party with its caudillos Menem 
and Duhalde, and then with Kirchner and Duhalde in shaping the piquetero movement.  Each 
branch of the piquetero movement openly supports one of the two most powerful Argentine 
caudillos, Kirchner or Duhalde.19   Moreover, the division within the piquetero movement into 
several associations also suggests that the network of social and personal relationships between the 
piquetero leaders and Peronist leaders also shaped the movement.  Because the network of social 
alliances and personal relationships is usually decentralized and dispersed, this partially explains 
(from the clientelist demand side) why each branch of the piquetero movement is not cohesive and 
contains different organizations. Thus, certain former unionists with relevant linkages to leaders of 
the Peronist party could have received more attention than others from any branch of the ruling 
party. This fact could explain their personal emergence as piquetero leaders.  
                                                
18 See Parodi (2003). 
19 La Nación, November 30, 2005 
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Table 3 compiles the division of power within the piquetero movement.  Notably, there is no 
publicly official data on the activities of the piqueteros, so the following is based on data reported to 
the press by leaders of various factions of the movement. However, data from table 3 provides us 
with some idea of the optimal number of piqueteros chosen by Duhalde and Kirchner, 80,940 and 
82,000, respectively.  
[ Table 3 Here ] 
2.- The clientelist supply 
 In the piquetero organization, the piquetero leaders are the intermediaries between the State 
and the members. Again, because the leaders in the ruling party are attempting to maximize political 
support, they have each granted several concessions to the piquetero leaders through their 
respective political bosses who are variously situated throughout the Argentine government 
(Escudé, 2005).  Due to these concessions, the piquetero leaders have been favored with a certain 
level of political autonomy and influence.  The piquetero leaders enjoy their power thanks to the 
subsidies, food, and temporary job opportunities that they receive from different factions within the 
Argentine government. In attempting to increase their level of autonomy and political power 
through participating in the movement, the piquetero leaders channel as many resources as they can 
from the State to the members of their associations.  By doing this, the leaders try to incorporate as 
many members as they can into their respective associations.20  
To succeed, the leaders must consider the individual utility maximization of their members.  
This calculation is based on the rational choice theory of economist Marcur Olson (1971), which 
focused on the weighing of costs and benefits, rather than ideologies and grievances.  Under this 
concept of rationality, the individual will adopt a course of action that yields the highest expected 
                                                
20 Therefore, I assume the following: 
If n is the number of members and Uleader(n+) is the utility function of a piquetero leader (the payoff is defined by 
the level of autonomy and political power), then  Uleader(n+1) > Uleader(n). 
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utility, where the expected utility of any action is the sum of the individuals valuations of the 
possible outcomes multiplied by the probability that these outcomes will occur if the individual 
chooses the given course of action (Salert, 1976).  However, Olsons collective action theory has 
been criticized because it does not solve the problem of free rider behavior in the theory of public 
goods as it relates to the case of revolutions.21  Barbara Salert (26) outlines this dilemma quite 
succinctly,  
This problem typically arises when the group of people interested in the public good 
is large. In this case, the contributions of any single individual toward supplying the 
public good may be expected to be small-so small, in fact as to be virtually 
negligible. For example, the average potential revolutionary probably expects to 
have very little impact either on the probability of the success of the revolution to fail 
if he does not participate and succeed if he does. If this is the case, the individual is 
in a situation in which, given the nature of public goods, the probability of his 
receiving the good (in this case, the results of a revolution) is not dependent of his 
actions.  
 
Nevertheless, for Salert, the weaknesses of Olsons theory disappear when private goods 
(goods for which exclusion is possible) or selective incentives (for example, subsidies) are 
attached to the public good so that the individual cannot obtain the private good, unless he 
simultaneously helps to provide the public good.  Thus, for the piquetero case, the piquetero leaders 
could solve the problem of free rider by monitoring closely the piquetero members activities and 
participation in the movement (Svampa & Pereyra, 2003; Escudé, 2005).  In other words, the goal 
was to convert a potential public good into a private good to solve this problem of collective action 
(Taylor, 1990).  Thus, by granting private property rights through monetary allowances 
(participation in exchange for the subsidy), the piquetero leaders could ensure the active 
participation of their members and the consolidation of their power.  The tactics employed to solve 
the free rider problem could also help explain the fragmentation within the piquetero movement 
                                                
21 Free riders attempt to get accessed to the provision of a certain good without any cost.  Because any entrepreneur or 
the state cannot discriminate among customers when they provide public goods, the customers try to consume the good 
and avoid any payment.  
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into several organizations (from the clientelist supply side).   The size of the piquetero organizations 
seems to be also influenced by the constraints specified by Olsons collective action theory.   
The institutional explanation from a comparative perspective 
 The institutional explanation described in this paper and the assumptions about the structure 
of the ruling party can offer the adequate framework to understand the growth and endurance of 
such a movement in a Latin American polity.  In particular, the presence of a strong conflict and 
competition between the two most powerful caudillos within the ruling party contributed 
powerfully to the success and endurance of the piquetero movement.   
 Therefore, on the one hand, under the presence of a hegemonic leadership, leaders prefer to 
grant subsidies and buy votes without the costs of supporting a distinct social movement.22   On the 
other hand, however, under tough competition between the two main factions within the ruling 
party (Peronist), Argentine political leaders preferred to tolerate the political costs imposed by a 
distinct movement (continuous public violations of the Argentine law), to support its endurance 
with subsidies, and to permit the formation and strengthening of its particular identity -- the 
piquetero identity.  
III.- TRANSFORMATIONS AND DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENT  
 Recent statistics on the evolution of the piquetero movement confirm the progressive decline 
of the piquetero movement.  Because of the decline of Duhaldism within the Peronist party after 
Kirchner took office in 2003, competition between the two main leaders of the Peronist party has 
been weakening since 2003.  Duhaldes opposition to Kirchner was effective until 2005, when 
Kirchner challenged Duhaldes domination in the province of Buenos Aires and defeated him.  
                                                
22 Such a social phenomenon is being seen in Venezuela with the installation of the Bolivarian committees.  In this 
case, the Venezuelan executive branch prefers to grant subsidies and buy votes without supporting a dictint social 
movement, which could produce more autonomy for the movements leaders (intermediaries) and reinforce a potentially 
troublesome distinct identity. 
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Duhaldism is residual now within Peronism (Calvo, 2005).  In fact, Duhaldism was routed in the 
last election of 2005, when it lost even in such enclaves as Avellaneda, Florencia Varela, San 
Miguel, Almirante Brown, Lomas de Zamora and Quilmes, traditionally loyal to Duhalde and his 
allies.  In addition, Duhalde himself is semi-retired, and he currently lives in Montevideo. 
 This decline in the levels of competition within Peronism has coincided with a significant 
reduction in the activities of the movement, measured by the number of roadblocks (Massetti, 2006; 
Consuasor, 2006).23  The declining competition within the Peronist party has shaped the 
expectations of the leaders of the movement on the potential effectiveness of their protests for 
achieving their goals.  Likewise, without sharp competition within the party, the Peronist leaders 
have become less willing to support organizations or political entities which employ protests and 
roadblocks as tactics. Figure 1 shows this decline. 
[ Figure 1 Here ] 
 Furthermore, the structure of piquetero alliances has suffered an important transformation: 
the piquetero movement is no longer divided into two main factions.  The number of alliances, 
factions, and political affiliations of the piquetero associations has multiplied and diversified 
(Massetti, 2006; Alcañiz & Scheier, 2007).  To sum up, the decline in the levels of competition and 
the changes within the structure of the Peronist party  along with the decline of Duhaldism -- have 
affected the activity and the structure of the piquetero movement. 
 Although some empirical studies offer some information on the relationship between the 
amount of workfare benefits and number of strikes (roadblocks) or the impact of political affiliation 
(with the president) on the amount of workfare benefits; these works, nevertheless, do not address 
the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement from a comparative perspective based on 
                                                
23 The number of piquetes (roadblocks) fell down by 8% in 2004 and 13% in 2005 (Massetti, 2006). The amount of 
piquetes continued to decline during 2006 (Consuasor, 2006). 
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Latin America (Lodola, 2005; Franceschelli & Ronconi, 2005; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006; Giraudy, 
2007).  Furthermore, these studies do not evaluate the effects of the intra-party competition within 
Peronism, and consequently, within the Argentine government (at the federal or provincial level).    
 Consequently, these studies cannot explain why Argentine leaders prefer to practice 
clientelism through supporting the growth of a social movement with greater political autonomy and 
a distinct identity (the piquetero identity).  In addition, these studies cannot explain why the growth 
and long endurance of an urban social movement, which has kept a dual relationship with the state -
- conflictive (due to its roadblocks), and mutually beneficial (political ranks and electoral support 
for politicians in exchange of subsidies), has been successful in Argentina but not in other Latin 
American countries.  Other attempts to organize a movement of the unemployed or with low 
income populations with this dual relationship have failed or have had short lives.  Clear examples 
have been the piquetero attempts to replicate its movement in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.24   
 However, for further research, I suggest quantifying the impact of the rivalry within the 
Peronist party on the activities (number of roadblocks) and the amount of workfare spent on the 
movement by the Argentine state.  Although this empirical study would not allow us to analyze the 
piquetero movement from a comparative perspective, with Latin America as a framework, this 
exercise could quantitatively determine the role and impact of the conflicting Argentine institutions 
on the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement.  
IV.- CONCLUSIONS 
 Several lessons can be obtained from this study.  First, because the purposes of the piquetero 
social movement are mainly clientelist (i.e., to obtain material benefits for members and political 
autonomy for the leaders of the movement), the development of this movement has followed a 
                                                
24 Consult http://bolivia.indymedia.org/es/2004/09/11872.shtml,  http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/09/16/elpais/p-
01802.htm , and http://www.sindicatomercosul.com.br/noticia02.asp?noticia=17765 
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different pattern from most other traditional Latin American social movements.  Other scholars such 
as Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992), Gideon Baker (2002), Judith Hellman (1992), and Sonia 
Alvarez & Arturo Escobar (1992) have already alerted us to the emergence and growth of this wave 
of new social movements in Latin America, which in several cases are more interested in 
demanding economic and social concessions from the state than from the capitalist employers.   
 Second, the development of the piquetero social movement is connected to the political 
structures of the Argentine ruling party and the rules of the Argentine federalism.  For this 
movement, I find clear causal relationships: when the ruling party is more decentralized and divided 
into two competing political heads, the piquetero associations become correspondingly stronger, 
more consolidated, and more divided into two factions (duros and blandos).  The more intense 
the competition is between the two main leaders, the stronger the piquetero movement becomes.  
This fact sheds lights on the potential political consequences of having a decentralized and non-
cohesive ruling party on the development of clientelistic dysfunctional entities whose existence 
depends directly on the formal party system and the state.  This is a case in which the combination 
of this particular institutional arrangement with a high unemployment rate could create a distinct 
social movement of unemployed people like the piquetero movement.  The Argentine economic 
crisis, the co-optation of the unemployed as an opportunity to avoid popular dissatisfaction, the 
Argentine electoral rules, and the connections of Argentine labor unions with the piquetero 
associations also triggered this political phenomenon. 
 Third, these findings and correlations again place in question the traditional conception of 
civil society as the purveyor of democracy in Latin America.  There has clearly been a bias among 
many scholars to focus exclusively on the contributions of a mobilized civil society when it is 
involved in attempting to bring about or strengthen liberal democracy (Baker, 2002).  However, this 
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tendency has been seriously challenged by new empirical findings. These empirical contributions 
have shown that civil society does not necessarily support democracy, and has in some cases pushed 
for alternative forms of government (Berman, 1997).  As a result, one should be cautious from 
believing wholesale in the myth of a virtuous civil society that is always on the side of good 
governance (Salazar, 1999; Rucht, 2003).  
 Within the Latin American context, in Argentina, there has been a dual interaction between 
the piquetero social movement and the two heads of the ruling party (caudillos).  The final result 
has been more clientelism, increasing conflict and disunity within the main political party in 
Argentina (the Peronist party), and the strengthening of the power of the caudillos in the 
Argentine polity.  Venezuela offers a similar example.  In this country, the present-day conflict also 
defies traditional assumption about the role of social movements in democratization.  The 1999 
Bolivarian Constitution legitimized civil societys insertion into the political sphere through 
plebiscitary measures and citizen-initiated processes.  However, the institutionalization of 
Venezuelan civil society did not lead to the building of a common collective interest. On the 
contrary, this form of participatory democracy - coupled with the discredit of the traditional 
Venezuelan political parties - has increased political conflicts and might weaken democracy 
(García-Guadilla, Mallén & Guillén, 2004).  
 Both the recent Argentine and Venezuelan experiences raise relevant questions for further 
discussion and research.  First, civil society can be easily co-opted by state actors through the 
offering of subsidies and material help. Building this assumption into my analysis, I have argued 
that sectors of the executive branch can calculate and set a small enough allowance per individual 
in order to accumulate a substantial level of political support from civil society.  However, unlike 
the Argentine case, political leaders in most other countries prefer to grant subsidies and buy votes 
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without the costs of supporting a distinct social movement.  For example, in the absence of a 
division and competition within the Venezuelan ruling party, the executive branch prefers to grant 
subsidies and buy votes without supporting a distinct social movement, which could produce more 
political autonomy for the movements leaders and reinforce a potentially troublesome distinct 
identity. 
 Because the members of the target groups are usually poor or unemployed people (high 
marginal utility for a small allowance), the Argentine experience reveals that the structure of 
preferences and their limited budgets of these individuals facilitates their cooptation.  Second, the 
impact of civil society on the performance of the Latin American democracies directly depends on 
how civil society interacts with the political system, the design of institutions, and the incentives 
that institutions generate in a polity.  
 Finally, due to the similar economic and social conditions among the Latin American 
countries, I could generalize the central explanation developed in this paper for Argentina to predict 
the growth and endurance of this kind of social movement in other Latin American countries.  After 
relaxing the assumption related to the division and competition within the ruling party, a distinct 
social movement -- with a mutually beneficial and conflictive relationship with the state -- is not an 
outcome under this scenario.  Thus, leaders might prefer to practice clientelism without supporting 
the growth of a social movement with greater political autonomy and a distinct identity.    
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Table 1. Unemployment rates in Latin American countries 
 
 
 Countries/Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Argentina 7.3 5.8 6.7 10.1 12.1 18.8 17.2 14.9 12.8 14.1 15.0 17.4 19.6 15.6 . 
Bolivia 7.3 6.6 5.5 6.0 3.1 3.7 5.2 2.0 . 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.5 . . 
Brazil 3.7 . 6.4 6.0 . 6.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.6 . 9.3 9.1 9.7 . 
Chile 5.7 5.3 4.4 4.5 5.9 4.7 5.4 5.3 7.2 8.9 8.3 7.9 7.8 7.4 7.8 
Colombia 10.2 10.1 9.4 8.4 8.3 . 11.8 12.0 15.0 20.0 20.5 14.5 15.7 14.1 13.7 
Costa Rica 4.5 5.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.1 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.9 5.2 6.1 . 6.7 6.4 
Dominican Republic . 19.7 20.3 19.9 16.0 14.4 16.3 15.6 16.0 13.8 14.2 15.6 16.1 16.7 18.4 
Ecuador 6.1 5.8 8.9 8.3 7.1 6.9 10.4 9.2 11.5 14.0 9.0 10.7 9.1 11.4 8.6 
El Salvador 10.0 7.4 4.3 9.9 7.7 7.2 7.4 7.7 7.4 6.8 7.0 7.0 6.2 6.9 6.8 
Guatemala 3.9 3.2 . . . . . . 1.9 . 1.4 . 1.8 2.8 . 
Haiti 12.2 . . . . . . . . 7.2 . . . . . 
Honduras 4.8 4.7 3.2 . 2.8 3.2 4.3 3.2 4.0 3.8 . 4.2 3.8 5.1 5.9 
Mexico . 3.0 3.1 3.2 4.2 5.8 4.3 3.4 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.5 3.0 
Nicaragua 10.9 14.0 14.4 . . 16.9 14.9 13.3 13.2 10.9 9.8 11.3 12.2 7.8 . 
Panama . 16.1 14.7 13.3 14.0 14.0 14.3 13.4 14.0 11.8 13.5 14.7 14.1 13.6 12.3 
Paraguay 6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.4 . 8.2 5.4 5.3 6.6 . 7.6 10.8 8.1 . 
Peru . 5.8 9.4 9.9 8.9 7.1 7.1 7.7 7.8 8.0 7.3 7.9 9.7 10.3 10.5 
St. Lucia . . . 16.8 17.1 16.3 16.3 20.5 21.6 18.1 16.4 . 18.3 24.8 . 
Uruguay 8.5 9.0 9.0 8.3 9.2 10.2 11.9 11.4 10.0 11.3 13.6 15.2 17.0 16.8 . 
Venezuela 10.3 9.5 7.7 6.7 8.6 10.2 11.8 11.2 11.2 14.9 13.9 12.9 15.6 16.8 . 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Table 2. Party Centralization Index (2005) 
 
 
Countries Party Centralization Index
Argentina 10.0
Brazil 10.5
Chile 11.0
Dominican Republic 11.0
Colombia 11.8
Mexico 12.0
Uruguay 12.0
Paraguay 13.0
Venezuela 13.5
Ecuador 14.0
El Salvador 14.0
Panama 14.0
Peru 14.0
Costa Rica 14.5
Honduras 15.0
Nicaragua 15.5
Guatemala 16.5
Bolivia 17.0
 
Source: Jones (2005). The index was constructed by Mark Jones.  
 
The index evaluates how responsive legislators are to national party leaders. The index was constructed based on six 
components. The first component of the index focuses on the extent party leaders are in charge of determining who is 
able to run for office on the electoral list. The second component takes into account key features of the territorial 
dimension of the electoral districts (national, regional, single-member) and whether voters can choose among individual 
candidates instead of pre-selected party lists. The rest of the components evaluates: whether presidential and legislative 
elections are hepld concurrently; the degree of autonomy of sub-national authorities; the extent to which parties are 
internally democratic; and the extent to which presidential candidates have been selected through primaries.   
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Table 3. The social movement in numbers 
 
ALLIED WITH DUHALDE (the 
duros) 
 
Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC) 
Leader: Juan Carlos Alderete  
Political affiliation: Partido Comunista 
Revolucionario 
Members: 70,000 
               Beneficiaries of social plans: 50,000 
 
ALLIED WITH KIRCHNER (the 
blandos or kirchneristas) 
 
Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) 
Leader: Luis DElía 
Political affiliation: Central de 
Trabajadores Argentinos. 
Members: 125,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 75,000 
Public dining rooms: 2,000 
 Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y 
Desocupados (MIJD) 
Leader: Raul Castells 
Members: 60,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 7,000  
               Public dining rooms: 1,052 
 
Polo Obrero 
Leader: Néstor Pritola 
Political affiliation: Partido Obrero (PO) 
Members: 25,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 20,000 
              Public dining rooms: 560 
 
Coordinadora de Unidad Barrial (CUBA) 
Leader: Oscar Kuperman 
Members: 4,680 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 1,140 
              Public dining rooms: 28 
 
Barrios de Pie 
Leader: Jorge Ceballos 
Political affiliation: Patria Libre 
Members: 60,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 7,000 
               Public dining rooms: 800 
  
 
Frente de Trabajadores Combativos 
Leader: Ernesto Aldana 
Political affiliation: Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) 
Members: 7,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 2,800 
 
Source: La Nación, June 28, 2004. Page 6. This information was provided by the leaders of each 
organization. 
 
 
 
